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NOTES
SECTION 3E1.1 CONTRITION AND FIFTH
AMENDMENT INCRIMINATION: IS
THERE AN IRON FIST BENEATH THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES' VELVET
GLOVE?
The Sentencing Reform Act of 19841 was enacted in response
1 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991-998 (1988), and other scattered sections). The Sentencing Reform Act was enacted as
title II, chapter H of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1976. See generally B. GEORGE, THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL AcT OF 1984
(1986 & Supp. 1988) (surveying statute); Symposium on the Crime Control Act of 1984, 22
Am. CRim. L. REv. 707, 707-803 (1985) (discussing sentencing, criminal forfeiture, attorney-
client relationship, and other aspects of the Crime Control Act).
The need for sentencing reform was recognized as early as 1966 when, pursuant to Pres-
ident Lyndon B. Johnson's recommendation, the National Commission on Reform of Fed-
eral Criminal Laws ("Brown Commission") was formed to investigate the problems of fed-
eral sentencing. Nagel, Foreword: Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 899 n.93 (1990). The Brown
Commission's findings spurred congressional hearings in 1971, see Reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 129-514 (1971), and legislative proposals in
1973, see S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-4A1 to 1-4A5 (1973), reprinted in Reform of the
Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4247-60 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings]
(sentencing chapter of Criminal Justice Codification, Revision and Reform Act of 1973 in-
troduced by Senators Ervin, Hruska, and McClellan); S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2001-
2402 (1973), reprinted in Hearings, supra, at 5004-17 ("General Sentencing Provisions" of
Criminal Code Reform Act of 1973 introduced by Senators Hruska and McClellan).
In 1973, Judge Frankel, a United States District Judge for the Southern District of New
York, attacked the existing sentencing practices and proposed the creation of a sentencing
commission that would be responsible for promulgating sentencing guidelines for the federal
courts. See Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. Rzv. 1, 50-54 (1972). Judge
Frankel's suggestions played an influential role in the course of sentencing reform and for
his efforts he was dubbed "the father of sentencing reform" by Senator Edward Kennedy.
Nagel, supra, at 899 n.97. Heeding Judge Frankel's advice, Senator Kennedy introduced a
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to both the ineffectiveness of prisoner rehabilitation efforts 2 and
the disparities in sentencing that resulted from the unfettered ex-
ercise of discretion by judges and parole authorities.3 In an effort
bill to establish uniform sentencing guidelines. See S. 2699, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG.
REc. 37,562-64 (1975). Finally, following several years of revisions and refinements, S. 1762
was introduced. S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S11,679-712 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1983) (reporting "Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983"). See generally Nagel, supra,
at 899-902 (discussing legislative history of Sentencing Reform Act of 1984); Comment, The
Constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Reform Act After Mistretta v. United States,
17 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 683, 683-93 (1990) (same).
2 See United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1816 (1990). Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act, prison sentencing followed the med-
ical model, which regarded criminal behavior as a disease that could be treated and cured
scientifically. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, LAW WITHOUT ORDER 89 (1973) ("first
dubiety [of rehabilitative model] is the fallacious ... assumption that criminals are 'sick' in
some way that calls for 'treatment' "). The dominant goal of the medical model was rehabili-
tation. Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1207. However, the Senate Judiciary Committee's investiga-
tion into medical model sentencing revealed the following:
Recent studies suggest that this approach has failed, and most sentencing judges
as well as the Parole Commission agree that the rehabilitation model is not an
appropriate basis for sentencing decisions. We know too little about human be-
havior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a routine basis or even to deter-
mine accurately whether or when a particular prisoner has been rehabilitated.
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3182, 3223 (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225].
3 See Kennedy, Toward a New System of Criminal Sentencing: Law with Order, 16
AM. CRiM. L. REV. 353, 357 (1979) (sentencing reform influenced by "recent studies demon-
strating inequity in the sentences actually imposed on similarly situated offenders convicted
of the same crimes"); see also Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1207 (under indeterminate sentencing,
court establishes maximum length for defendant's sentence, but actual length determined
by parole board).
Disparity in sentencing refers to "'the imposition of substantially different sentences
for the same offense or for offenses of comparable seriousness, without any apparent ra-
tional basis.'" Comment, supra note 1, at 683 (quoting COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NAT'L
COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, GUIDES FOR SENTENCING 57 (2d ed. 1974)). But cf.
Lowe, Modern Sentencing Reform: A Preliminary Analysis of the Proposed Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1987) ("there is no single definition of dispar-
ity in sentencing").
Investigations have revealed significant sentencing disparities in federal courts. See,
e.g., A. PARTRIDGE & W. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY, A REPORT TO
THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974), reprinted in S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at
41-43 (on identical hypothetical presentence reports, sentences imposed by fifty federal
judges ranged from twenty years imprisonment and a $65,000 fine to three years imprison-
ment and no fine). Furthermore, studies have indicated that sentencing disparity may rest
on irrational bases such as race, gender, or social class. See, e.g., Tiffany, Avichal & Peters,
A Statistical Analysis of Sentencing in Federal Courts: Defendants Convicted After Trial
1967-1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 369, 388 (1975) ("simplest explanation [for sentencing dispar-
ity] may be the correct one-the difference may be due to race"). The Senate Judiciary
Committee concluded that
[t]hese disparities, whether they occur at the time of the initial sentencing or at
the parole stage, can be traced directly to the unfettered discretion the law confers
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to curb this unrestrained discretion, Congress created the United
States Sentencing Commission ("Commission")4 as an independent
agency charged with the responsibility of promulgating detailed,
on those judges and parole authorities responsible for imposing and implementing
the sentence. This sweeping discretion flows from the lack of any statutory guid-
ance or review procedures to which courts and parole boards might look.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 38 (footnote omitted).
Discretion refers to "the freedom or authority to make decisions and choices." Wan-
STER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 403 (2d ed. 1982). Proponents of judicial discretion argued
that it was necessary to individualize sentencing, which in turn is indispensable to the medi-
cal model concept that individual criminals respond differently to rehabilitation attempts.
See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("modem philosophy of penology
[is] that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime"); Alschuler, The
Selling of the Sentencing Guidelines: Some Correspondence with U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission, in THm U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CRnMINAL JUSTICE 50 (D.
Champion ed. 1989) (criticizing federal sentencing guidelines as dehumanizing, political, im-
patient, simple, and mechanistic solution to human problems). Opponents of judicial discre-
tion, however, argued that it left sentencing to the whim of the particular judge, subject to
his or her peculiar personality traits. See, e.g., Corrothers, Rights in Conflict: Fairness Is-
sues in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 26 Cram. L. BULL. 38, 44 (1990) ("neither society
nor individual defendants are well served by a justice system that operates like a roulette
wheel"); Frankel, supra note 1, at 8 ("[it is disturbing enough that a charged encounter like
the sentencing proceeding, while it is the gravest of legal matters, should turn so arbitrarily
upon the variegated passions and prejudices of individual judges"); Lowe, supra note 3, at
11 n.54 (studies show that young, well-educated judges are more lenient than judges with
working class backgrounds). In addition, they argued that under discretionary sentencing,
the sentence imposed depended on the judge's personal view of the purposes of sentencing.
See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 38 ("each judge is left to apply his own notions of the
purposes of sentencing"). Furthermore, "[d]iscretion seemed inextricably linked with dis-
crimination" because "the offender's race, sex, religion, income, education, occupation and
other status characteristics were found to influence judicial outcomes." Nagel, supra note 1,
at 895. Consequently, the "perceived disparities in sentencing.., led to public loss of confi-
dence in the fair and impartial administration of criminal justice and ... [caused] many to
advocate the elimination of the sentencing discretion of the trial court judge." L. WILKINS,
J. KRESS, D. GOTTFREDSON, J. CALPN & A. GELMAN, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING
JUDICIAL DISCRETION at vii (1978); accord S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 49-50 ("existing
Federal system lacks the sureness that criminal justice must provide if it is to retain the
confidence of American society and if it is to be an effective deterrent against crime").
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988) (establishment and purposes of Commission). "The United
States Sentencing Commission... is an independent agency in the judicial branch com-
posed of seven voting and two non-voting, ex-officio members." UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM'N GUIELINES MANUAL 1.1 (1990) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The members of the Com-
mission are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, after
consultation with various individuals and entities "interested in the criminal justice pro-
cess." 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). At least three of the voting members must be federal judges and a
maximum of four may belong to the same political party. Id. The Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee has warned that "Presidential appointments based on politics rather than merit would,
and should, be an embarrassment to the appointing authority." S. REP. No. 225, supra note
2, at 160. Each member serves six years in office, but is subject to removal by the President
"for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown." 28 U.S.C. §§
991(a), 992(a).
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uniform federal sentencing guidelines. 5 The Commission was di-
rected to advance the goals of federal sentencinge by promoting
5 The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines "were promulgated by the
Commission on April 13, 1987, were reviewed by Congress, and became effective on Novem-
ber 1, 1987 for all federal crimes committed by individuals on or after that date." Cor-
rothers, supra note 3, at 39 (footnote omitted). For an annotated guide to the Guidelines,
see generally T. HUTCHISON & D. YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE (1989).
Prior to the sentencing guidelines, "[t]he judge was not required to articulate the rea-
sons for his sentencing decision, and the length of the sentence was not subject to appellate
review." Lee, The Sentencing Court's Discretion to Depart Downward in Recognition of a
Defendant's Substantial Assistance: A Proposal to Eliminate the Government Motion Re-
quirement, 23 IND. L. REV. 681, 682 (1990); see also Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S.
424, 431 (1974) ("once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in
the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end") (footnote omitted).
Under the sentencing guidelines, however, sentencing judges must state "the reasons for
[their] imposition of a particular sentence," see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988), and may only
exercise discretion within the guidelines' boundaries. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (emphasis
added) ("court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range"); see also S. REP.
No. 225, supra note 2, at 79 (rejecting amendment that would have allowed departure
"whenever a judge determined that the characteristics of the offender or the circumstances
of the offense warranted deviation"). Furthermore, the sentence can be set aside if it "(1)
was imposed in violation of law; (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of
the sentencing guidelines; (3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and is unreasona-
ble . . .; or (4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing
guideline and is plainly unreasonable." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).
I See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1988) (directing Commission to "establish sentencing policies
and practices" that advance purposes of sentencing); U.S.S.G., supra note 4, at 1.1 ("broad
authority" granted to Commission to develop "guidelines that will further the basic pur-
poses of criminal punishment" by "review[ing] and rationaliz[ing] the federal sentencing
process"). The Commission was directed to create guidelines within certain statutorily cre-
ated boundaries. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (outlining specific congressional directives within
which Commission must act). Furthermore, the Commission is required continually to re-
view and refine the guidelines. Id. § 994(o).
The Senate Judiciary Committee announced four purposes of sentencing:
(1) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment; (2) the need to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; (3) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and (4) the need to provide the defendant with educational or voca-
tional training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 50 (footnote omitted). The purposes outlined by the Judi-
ciary Committee are merely "a restatement of the basic purposes of sentencing-deterrence,
incapacitation, punishment, and rehabilitation." Nagel, supra note 1, at 901 n.109. Rehabili-
tation was retained as one of the objectives of federal sentencing even though "arguments
were advanced that rehabilitation should be eliminated completely as a purpose of sentenc-
ing." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 76. At the same time, the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee recognized that "in light of current knowledge,. .. 'imprisonment is not an appropriate
means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.'" Id. (quoting proposed language of 18
U.S.C. § 3582(a)); see also supra note 2 (noting failure of rehabilitation under medical
model of sentencing). "[T]he Committee did not intend to abandon efforts at rehabilitating
prisoners: rather, it intended to make clear that imprisonment should not be the sentence of
1080
1991] THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1081
"honesty," "reasonable uniformity," and "proportionality" in the
sentencing procedure.7 In a further effort to limit discretion in the
lengths of prison sentences, Congress also acted to abolish the sys-
tem of parole effective November 1992.8
Although prisoner rehabilitation efforts and sentencing discre-
tion have been curtailed" under the United States Sentencing
Commission Guidelines ("Guidelines"), courts have been accorded
a certain amount of latitude in imposing sentences on criminals
who have exhibited some potential for reform.10 For example, while
choice if the primary purpose for the sanction is rehabilitation of the offenders." Nagel,
supra note 1, at 901 n.109. Consequently, "[p]rograms which enhanced the possibility of
rehabilitation... [have been] continued." Id.
7 U.S.S.G., supra note 4, at 1.2 (outlining basic approach to federal sentencing). The
common thread running through all three objectives is the "basic objective... to enhance
the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentenc-
ing system." Id. Regarding "honesty," Congress "sought to avoid the confusion and implicit
deception that arose out of the pre-guidelines sentencing system which required the court to
impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment and empowered the parole commission
to determine how much of the sentence an offender actually would serve in prison." Id. As a
result of the parole system, defendants often served "only about one-third of the sentence
imposed by the court." Id. The simple solution to this problem was to abolish parole. Id.;
see infra note 8.
With regard to "uniformity" and "proportionality," however, Congress encountered ten-
sion between "narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal of-
fenses committed by similar offenders" and developing "a system that imposes appropri-
ately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity." Id. Although "there was
no completely satisfying solution to this problem," Congress directed the Commission "to
balance the comparative virtues and vices of broad, simple categorization and detailed, com-
plex subcategorization, and within the constraints established by that balance, minimize the
discretionary powers of the sentencing court." Id. at 1.3.
8 See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, at 1.2 ("abolition of parole makes the sentence imposed
by the court the sentence the offender will serve, less approximately fifteen percent for good
behavior"). The Parole Commission is scheduled for a complete phase-out in November
1992. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, §§ 218(a)(5), 235(b)(1)(A), 98 Stat. 2032 (1984) (repeal-
ing 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218).
9 See supra notes 2-3 (discussing failure of prisoner rehabilitation as a goal of incarcer-
ation and efforts to curtail discretion of sentencing authorities); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(k)
(1988) ("Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of impos-
ing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or
providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment").
10 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 51-52. The sentencing guidelines did not elimi-
nate discretion, but rather structured and defined its boundaries. Thus, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee noted the following.
The sentencing guidelines system will not remove all of the judge's sentencing
discretion. Instead, it will guide the judge in making his decision on the appropri-
ate sentence....
... The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure for
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the Guidelines as a whole provide for a system of determinate sen-
tencing,11 rehabilitation and discretion remain important factors
under section 3E1.1,12 which provides for a two-level reduction in
sentence "[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition
and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his crimi-
nal conduct."' 3 The sentencing judge is permitted to consider a
wide variety of factors in determining entitlement to the two-level
reduction. 4 However, difficult issues of statutory interpretation
and constitutional law are implicated when the sentence reduction
is denied based on the defendant's refusal to accept responsibility
for crimes other than those to which he pleaded guilty or of which
he has been convicted. 15 In United States v. Perez-Franco,6 the
evaluating the fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual of-
fender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences.
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988) (guidelines should "provide certainty and fair-
ness in meeting the purposes of sentencing,... while maintaining sufficient flexibility to
permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not
taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices").
Rehabilitation continues "to be a particularly important consideration for persons
placed on probation." Nagel, supra note 1, at 901 n.109; see also United States v. Scroggins,
880 F.2d 1204, 1208 n.10 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting various sections of title 18 of U.S.C. in
which rehabilitation still plays role), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1816 (1990); supra note 6 (not-
ing limited role of rehabilitation under sentencing guidelines).
" See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
12 See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 3El.l, comment. (n.5) ("determination of the sentenc-
ing judge is entitled to great deference on review" because "sentencing judge is in a unique
position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility"); Purdy & Lawrence, Plea
Agreements Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 26 CRn. L. BULL. 483, 504 (1990)
("reduction [in sentence] for acceptance of responsibility in furtherance of legitimate socie-
tal interests remains an important area of judicial discretion under guideline sentencing");
see also Capra, Sentencing Guidelines and the Fifth Amendment, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 3, 1991, at
3, col. 1 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970)) ("[l]enient treatment for
contrite defendants is deemed warranted because such defendants have shown that they will
'enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success of rehabilita-
tion over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary' ").
13 U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 3El.l(a). The two-level reduction "translates into about a
twenty percent reduction for most defendants--'somewhat less than twenty percent at the
highest offense levels, substantially more at the lowest levels.'" Mank, Truth in Sentencing:
Accepting Responsibility Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 25 GoNz. L.
REv. 183, 190 (1990) (quoting Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459, 471 (1988)).
4 See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1) (providing nonexhaustive list of
appropriate considerations in determining acceptance of responsibility).
15 See Cohen, Symposium: Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 26 Cram. L. BULL. 3, 4
(1990) (citing United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1989)) (Perez-Franco,
which did not require defendant to accept responsibility for uncharged crimes, "is the type
of decision certain to produce scholarly criticisms and, indeed, such manuscripts have begun
to appear on my desk").
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First Circuit, on the basis of statutory interpretation and the fifth
amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, held
that a reduction in sentence could not be predicated on acceptance
of responsibility for charges dismissed pursuant to a plea agree-
ment.17 Since Perez-Franco was decided, however, a sharp division
has developed among the circuits regarding both the statutory and
constitutional issues associated with section 3E1.1.18
This Note will examine the various approaches taken by the
circuit courts in reconciling the two-level reduction of sentence
provided in section 3E1.1 with the fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination."9 Part One will discuss the is-
16 873 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1989).
17 Id. at 464. But cf. United States v. O'Neil, 936 F.2d 599, 600 (1st Cir. 1991) (uphold-
ing sentence because court "simply considered the appellants later conduct, such as his use
of marijuana, for the light that conduct shed on the authenticity of appellant's claimed
remorse"); United States v. Paz Uribe, 891 F.2d 396, 400 (1st Cir. 1989) (rejecting defend-
ants claim that § 3E1.1 "places him in the unconstitutional dilemma of abandoning his
right not to incriminate himself or risking higher sentence"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2216
(1990). The First Circuit's reasoning was adopted by the Second Circuit, see United States
v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 626 (2d Cir. 1990) ("effect of requiring a defendant to accept
responsibility for crimes other than those to which he pled guilty or of which he has been
found guilty is to penalize him for refusing to incriminate himself"), and the Ninth Circuit,
see United States v. Piper, 918 F.2d 839, 841 (9th Cir. 1990) ("we agree with Perez-Franco
that a defendant may controvert evidence of other criminal conduct at sentencing without
thereby losing the reduction for acceptance of responsibility"); see also Sands & Coates,
The Mikado's Object: The Tension Between Relevant Conduct and Acceptance of Respon-
sibility in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 23 Amuz. ST. L.J. 61, 91-96 (1991) (Ninth
Circuit adopted Perez-Franco "by precedential increments"). The Third Circuit rejected the
First Circuit's reasoning as to the statutory interpretation issue, but adopted its position as
to the constitutional issue. See United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 656, 658 (3d Cir.
1991).
I See, e.g., United States v. Mourning, 914 F.2d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 1990) (requiring
acceptance of responsibility for all relevant criminal conduct); United States v. Munio, 909
F.2d 436, 440 n.4 (11th Cir. 1990) (Perez-Franco "is not precedent for this court and is
inconsistent with Spraggins and Henry"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1393 (1991); United
States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir.) ("we do not accept the holding and reasoning
of Perez-Franco as correct"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990).
19 Section 3E1.1, and the Guidelines in general, have come under heavy constitutional
attack. See B. GEORGE, supra note 1, §§ 8A.01-8A.02, at 486.10-486.14 (surveying constitu-
tional issues arising under Guidelines). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Sentencing Reform Act in Mistretta v. United States on nondelegation and separation
of powers grounds. 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). However, many constitutional issues remain
unresolved. See B. GEORGE, supra note 1, § 8A.02, at 486.22 (Mistretta "did not resolve all
the constitutional issues that federal sentenced defendants might advance"); Comment,
supra note 1, at 685 (Mistretta "declined the opportunity to consider questions concerning
the constitutionality of the Guidelines"). In addition to the fifth amendment claim, a num-
ber of defendants have unsuccessfully challenged section 3El.1 on sixth amendment
grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 920 F.2d 1530, 1537 (10th Cir. 1990) (rejecting
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sues of statutory interpretation implicated by the term "criminal
conduct" in section 3E1.1. Part Two will analyze the allegation
that section 3E1.1 places an unconstitutional condition or penalty
on the exercise of the defendant's fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. Finally, Part Three will pre-
sent various alternative approaches posited by courts and commen-
tators and will conclude that section 3E1.1 suffers from no consti-
tutional infirmities.
I. INTERPRETATION OF "CRIMINAL CONDUCT"
A threshold issue for courts addressing section 3E1.1 is deter-
mining what constitutes "criminal conduct" within the meaning of
the section.20 Courts espousing a narrow interpretation of "crimi-
nal conduct" argue that the term is limited to conduct to which
the defendant has pleaded guilty or of which he has been con-
victed.21 Courts favoring a broad interpretation argue that, the de-
fendant to be eligible for the two-level reduction in sentence, must
accept responsibility for all "relevant criminal conduct. '22 In justi-
defendant's claim that denial of downward adjustment under section 3E1.1 violates sixth
amendment right to jury trial); United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1019-20 (9th Cir.
1990) (same); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 826 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1112 (1989). The constitutional analysis of fifth and sixth amendment claims under
section 3E1.1 is similar. See United States v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1990)
(section 3E1.1 "does not violate either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment, but merely formalizes
and clarifies a tradition of leniency extended to defendants who express genuine remorse
and accept responsibility for their wrongs").
Section 3E1.1 has also been challenged unsuccessfully on equal protection grounds. See
United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457, 466 n.12 (10th Cir. 1990) (rejecting argument that
section 3E1.1 "violates equal protection in that it results in different sentences for defend-
ants convicted of the same crime" because "[g]iving defendants who accept responsibility
for their conduct lighter sentences than unrepentant defendants is rationally related to the
government's legitimate interest in rehabilitating convicted criminals"), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1087 (1991); see also United States v. Trujillo, 906 F.2d 1456, 1465 (10th Cir.) (sentenc-
ing judge "not obligated to consider codefendants' sentences when imposing sentence on a
defendant"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 396 (1990).
20 See, e.g., Mourning, 914 F.2d at 705-06 (defining scope of term "criminal conduct");
Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 628-32 (same); Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d at 458-59 (same).
21 See, e.g., Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 628-29 (defendant required to accept responsibility
only for conduct with respect to those counts to which he pleaded guilty).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 937 F.2d 676, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (section 3E1.1
not limited to "narrow offense of conviction and its essential elements"); Mourning, 914
F.2d at 706 (Guidelines encompass acceptance of responsibility for "all relevant criminal
conduct"). See generally Sands & Coates, supra note 17, at 64-74 (discussing "relevant con-
duct"). The Fourth Circuit, perhaps inadvertently, spoke of requiring acceptance of respon-
sibility for "all criminal conduct." See Gordon, 895 F.2d at 936 ("in order for section 3E1.1
of the guidelines to apply, a defendant must first accept responsibility for all of his criminal
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fying their disparate positions, courts have relied on a recent
amendment to section 3E1.1, commentary to the section, maxims
of statutory interpretation, and the legislative history and policy
objectives of section 3E1.1.
A. Amendment to Section 3E1.1
In determining whether "criminal conduct" should be given a
broad or narrow interpretation, a number of courts have focused
on a 1987 amendment to section 3E1.1,23 which substituted the
term "criminal conduct" for the term "offense of conviction.
24
The Commission's accompanying explanation stated only that
"[t]he purpose of this amendment is to clarify the guideline. 25
Courts espousing a narrow interpretation of "criminal con-
duct" assert two arguments to support their position that the term
extends only to the criminal conduct to which the defendant
pleads guilty or of which he has been convicted.26 First, these
courts observe "that the original 'offense of conviction' language
was believed to be ambiguous, because on its face it implies the
restrictive interpretation that a defendant actually had to be tried
and convicted of an offense. '27 Reasoning that a literal reading of
the section would prevent a defendant who pleaded guilty and
avoided trial from receiving a reduced sentence,28 these courts ar-
gue that the Commission must have adopted the 1987 amendment
merely to avoid such an inequitable result.29
conduct").
23 See, e.g., United v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 655 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing 1987
amendment to section 3E1.1); United States v. Mourning, 914 F.2d 699, 706 (5th Cir. 1990)
(same); United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); Perez-Franco,
873 F.2d at 458-59 (same).
24 U.S.S.G., supra note 4, app. C, at 378, amend. 46 ("[s]ection 3E1.1(a) is amended by
deleting 'the offense of conviction' and inserting in lieu thereof 'his criminal conduct' ").
The amendment took effect on January 15, 1988. Id.
25 Id.
26 Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d at 459; accord Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 629.
27 Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d at 459.
28 See United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1990) (amendment adopted
to remove "ambiguity as to whether the provision applies only to a defendant who has been
tried and convicted of an offense or applies also to one who has pled guilty"); Perez-Franco,
873 F.2d at 459 (original language "would incorrectly exclude guilty pleas, where no trial
occurs").
2" See Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 629 ("Commission has clarified that it intended the provi-
sion to apply to the defendant who has pled guilty, as well as one convicted after trial");
Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d at 459 (Commission intended to clarify original language which
"would incorrectly exclude guilty pleas"). Courts espousing a narrow interpretation of the
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The second basis for a narrow interpretation of the 1987
amendment is that a broader construction "would effect a change
rather than simply a clarification"30 of section 3E1.1. Related to
this argument is the distinction between the "real-offense" and
"charge-offense" systems of punishment. 1 The charge-offense sen-
tencing system prescribes punishment based on "the offense for
which the defendant was convicted," whereas the real-offense sen-
tencing system "bases punishment on the specific circumstances of
the case and the defendant's actual conduct." 2 Although the Com-
mission generally adopted a charge-offense approach in drafting
the Guidelines, certain sections were specifically excepted from
this general rule to reflect the real-offense approach.3 3 Because the
drafters did not expressly except section 3E1.1, the Second Circuit
in United States v. Oliveras3 4 concluded that the section reflects
the charge-offense approach to sentencing.3 5 According to the Sec-
ond Circuit, a broad interpretation of "criminal conduct" would
have changed section 3E1.1 to require a real-offense approach and
therefore would have contravened the Commission's intent merely
to clarify the section. 6
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Mourning3 7 rejected the
First and Second Circuits' interpretation of the amendment to sec-
tion 3E1.1 and concluded that the "guideline now speaks to ac-
ceptance of responsibility for all relevant criminal conduct." ' Al-
1987 amendment concede, however, that "Itihere may have been clarifying reasons other
than the ones discussed above." Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d at 459; accord Oliveras, 905 F.2d at
629.
Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 629.
8 See id. at 630 (discussing distinction between real-offense and charge-offense systems
and concluding that section 3E1.1 is based on charge-offense system of punishment). See
generally Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1988) (discussing compromises within Guide-
lines between real-offense and charge-offense sentencing systems).
1 Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 630.
33 Id. For example, "one compromise was to use a 'real offense' approach for a particu-
lar subset of crimes that includes drug trafficking." Id.
905 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1990).
8' Id. at 630. The court recognized, however, that the Commission had not adopted a
pure charge-offense approach since a real-offense approach was still applicable in drug traf-
ficking cases. Id.
11 See id. at 629-30 (discussing distinction between "real offense" and "charge offense"
and concluding that broad interpretation of "criminal conduct" would constitute change).
37 914 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1990).
1 Id. at 706; accord United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 655 (3d Cir. 1991). But cf.
Sands & Coates, supra note 17, at 85-89 (arguing Fifth Circuit overreached because court
not faced with Perez-Franco issue).
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though the Fifth Circuit made no significant effort to support its
position, 39 strong arguments for a broader interpretation do exist.40
For instance, before the Guidelines were promulgated, sentencing
judges had authority to weigh the defendant's real-offense behav-
ior.41 Thus, the 1987 amendment may have been intended merely
to clarify the position that a continuation of this real-offense ap-
proach was contemplated under the new Guidelines.
Furthermore, the argument that the original language of sec-
tion 3E1.1 was ambiguous because it restricted the reduction in
sentence to only those defendants who had been convicted after a
trial42 is defeated by the very language of section 3E1.1(b). That
section expressly states that the "conviction" could be "based
upon a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by the court or jury. '43 Fi-
nally, as the Second Circuit conceded, the term "'criminal con-
duct' is more encompassing than 'offense of conviction.' -44 It is
unlikely that the Commission would have employed "more encom-
passing" language without intending any change in the scope of
the statute,45 thus a broad construction of "criminal conduct" may
39 See Mourning, 914 F.2d at 706-07. The Fifth Circuit did note, however, that certain
sections of the Guidelines required the sentencing court to look only to the specific offense
committed, whereas section 3E1.1 contained no such restriction. Id. at 705.
40 See, e.g., Mank, supra note 13, at 194-98 (criticizing First Circuit's interpretation of
amendment to § 3E1.1 and offering several arguments for broader interpretation of "crimi-
nal conduct").
41 Mank, supra note 13, at 195-96; see also infra note 62 (discussing wide discretion of
sentencing judge prior to Guidelines).
In drafting the Guidelines, the Commission sought to establish "a system that blends
the constraints of the offense of conviction with the reality of the defendant's actual offense
conduct in order to gauge the seriousness of that conduct for sentencing purposes." Wilkins
& Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41
S.C.L. REv. 495, 497 (1990).
42 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
43 U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 3E1.l(b) ("defendant may be given consideration under this
section without regard to whether his conviction is based upon a guilty plea or a finding of
guilt by the court or jury or the practical certainty of conviction at trial"). Furthermore, the
restrictive interpretation would have been implausible "[i]n view of the fact that the over-
whelming majority of convictions in federal courts result from guilty pleas" and that "the
Commission intended to use the acceptance-of-responsibility section as a means to en-
courage guilty pleas." Mank, supra note 13, at 196.
" Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 629. By relying on verbal niceties such as the distinction be-
tween "change" and "clarification," the Second Circuit left itself open to criticism for its
position regarding the distinction between a "denial of benefit" and a "penalty." See id. at
627-28 (rejecting distinction between denial of benefit and penalty as "simple dichotomy"
that "does not answer the question").
45 Insisting that something can be "more encompassing" and yet not a "change" seems
a contradiction in terms. "[C]hange denotes a making or becoming distinctly different and
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be appropriate.
B. Commentary and Maxims of Statutory Construction
In defining the scope of "criminal conduct," courts have also
relied on the commentary to section 3E1.1 and on maxims of statu-
tory construction. 46 For instance, the Fifth Circuit, employing the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis, examined the words and phrases asso-
ciated with the term "criminal conduct" in the commentary to sec-
tion 3E1.1.47 Noting that the section's application note 1(c) lists
"voluntary and truthful admission to authorities of involvement in
the offense and related conduct" as one of the factors to consider
in determining whether a defendant has accepted responsibility,48
the Fifth Circuit concluded that "criminal conduct" should be in-
terpreted as broadly as "relevant conduct,' ' 49 a term used in sec-
tions of the Guidelines that follow the real-offense approach to
sentencing.50
The Second Circuit in Oliveras, applying the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, noted that "where Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in an-
other section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Con-
gress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion
or exclusion." 51 Therefore, the court concluded, since the Commis-
implies either a radical transmutation of character or replacement with something else."
WEasTER's NEW WORLD DIMONARY 237 (2d ed. 1982). To clarify is "to make or become
clear and free from impurities" or "to make or become easier to understand." Id. at 262.
"' See, e.g., Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 629-30 (discussing language of "offense and related
conduct" in commentary to § 3E1.1 and presuming that Commission's failure to use "rele-
vant conduct" was not mistake in draftsmanship). Maxims of statutory construction are
merely rules of thumb. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 979 (6th ed. 1990).
" See Mourning, 914 F.2d at 705-06 (concluding language of "offense and related con-
duct" in application notes to § 3E1.1, together with similar language of "relevant conduct"
in other sections of Guidelines, "illuminate the broad range of activities encompassed by
'criminal conduct' "). "Under the doctrine of 'noscitur a sociis', the meaning of questionable
or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of
other words or phrases associated with it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (6th ed. 1990)
(emphasis added).
8 U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 3E1.1, comment. (n.l(c)) (emphasis added). Similar lan-
guage appears elsewhere in the commentary. See id. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.3) ("truthful ad-
mission of involvement in the offense and related conduct will constitute significant evi-
dence of acceptance of responsibility"); id. § 3E1.1, comment. (backg'd) ("recognition and
affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for the offense and related conduct").
" See Mourning, 914 F.2d at 706.
50 See Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 629-30 (concluding that § 1B1.3 represents specific depar-
ture from general rule to use "charge offense" approach to sentencing).
51 Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 630 (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722
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sion employed the term "relevant conduct" throughout the Guide-
lines, its failure to use the term in section 3E1.1 "suggests that it
was referring to something else." 52
As demonstrated by the opinions of the Second and Fifth Cir-
cuits, the interpretive value of maxims is limited.53 A preferable
approach, it is suggested, is for courts to read the section in light of
its legislative history and policy objectives. 4
C. Legislative History and Policy Objectives of Section 3E1.1
In drafting section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines, the Commission
sought to balance the objectives of reasonable uniformity and cer-
tainty in sentencing with the goal of proportionality of punish-
ment.5 5 In an effort to achieve greater uniformity and predictabil-
(5th Cir. 1972)); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990) ("expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another").
2 Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 630.
83 See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Ca-
nons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (charac-
terizing maxims as "thrust and parry maneuver").
It is possible that the Commission's use of the phrase "related conduct" instead of "rel-
evant conduct" in section 3E1.1 is a mistake in draftsmanship. Congress directed that the
Guidelines be neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of
the offender. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988). As drafted, however, section 3E1.1 is gender specific.
See U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 3E1.1(a) ("for his criminal conduct") (emphasis added). The
need for a clarifying amendment in 1987 is further evidence of sloppiness in the drafting of
the section. See id. § 3E1.1, app. C, amend. 46. Thus, reliance on the presumption of accu-
rate draftsmanship may be unwarranted in this particular case.
4 Other than the Second Circuit's discussion of the compromise between the real-of-
fense and charge-offense sentencing systems, see Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 630, detailed discus-
sion by the courts of the legislative history and policy objectives of section 3E1.1 is lacking.
85 See Wilkins, Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role of the Offender,
and Departures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
23 WAKE FOREST L. Rnv. 181, 190 (1988). For an explanation of the three objectives that the
Commission was directed to seek, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Despite the efforts to promote uniformity and certainty in sentencing, it has been noted
that "since the guidelines have gone into effect, the degree of commitment and conformity
to the guidelines varies greatly among federal district judges." Goodstein & Kramer, Case
Processing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in THE U.S. SENTENCING GUMELINEs:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 126 (D. Champion ed. 1989).
After promulgation of the Guidelines, some judges unfamiliar with their terms aban-
doned their traditional discretion to "the probation officer's expertise in developing the
most appropriate guidelines sentence." Id. Indeed, most judges apparently took the Guide-
lines too literally and regarded them "as immutable and not open to alternative interpreta-
tions." Id. Obviously, these developments were contrary to the intent of the Commission,
which sought to preserve judicial discretion in the sentencing judge. Id.
Recent data indicate that federal judges now comply with the Guidelines more than
80% of the time. See Wilkins & Steer, supra note 41, at 496.
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ity in sentencing, the Commission considered a proposal that
would have awarded a defendant entering a plea of guilty a fixed
and automatic reduction in sentence." The automatic sentence re-
duction was rejected, however, because it "would [have] re-
ward[ed] every defendant who pled guilty regardless of the circum-
stances of the offense or the defendant's post-offense conduct. '57
Nevertheless, some form of leniency was deemed necessary in or-
der to reward contrite defendants" and to promote the govern-
50 Wilkins, supra note 55, at 190. In testifying before the Commission, Professor
Schulhofer, of the University of Chicago Law School, offered the following proposal:
Explicit guilty plea discounts. The sentencing guidelines could authorize or re-
quire a specified sentence reduction in the case of convictions by guilty plea....
Amount of the discount. The discount should be small-10% or perhaps 15% at
most. This is a crucial point because we are considering here the automatic dis-
count that will be built into the guidelines and extended to all offenders on a
uniform basis. Larger discounts would pressure a plea from the innocent defend-
ant who has significant prospects for acquittal at trial; at the same time larger
discounts would extend unwarranted leniency to the clearly guilty offender whose
defense (if any) could be easily overcome at trial. The occasional need for larger
discounts is best met on a case-by-case basis through charge-reduction agreements
negotiated with prosecutorial approval and reviewed by the judge under Rule
11(e)(2).
Id. (quoting United States Sentencing Comm'n Public Hearing on Plea Agreements in
Washington, D.C. 8, 16 (Sept. 23, 1986)).
57 Id. at 191. The automatic reduction was criticized because "it would [have] result[ed]
in unjustified windfalls in many cases" and it "would not [have] be[en] in keeping with the
public's perception of justice." Id. at 190-91. But see Sands & Coates, supra note 17, at 106
(restricting section 3E1.1 "to counts pled to or convicted of would not guarantee that every
defendant receive credit").
See Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 498 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[w]hile every person is entitled to stand silent, it is more virtuous for the wrongdoer to
admit his offense and accept the punishment he deserves"); see also Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (constitutional to extend benefit to defendant who pleads guilty
because he "demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to
enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilita-
tion over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary"); United States v.
Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488, 1497 (D. Or. 1988) (section 3El.1 "recognizes societal interest in
... increased potential for rehabilitation among those who feel and show true remorse for
their anti-social conduct"), aff'd, 894 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 164
(1990).
On the topic of voluntary confessions, Justice Scalia asserted the following:
Not only for society, but for the wrongdoer himself, "admissio[n] of guilt. . ., if
not coerced, [is] inherently desirable," because it advances the goals of both "jus-
tice and rehabilitation." A confession is rightly regarded by the sentencing guide-
lines as warranting a reduction of sentence, because it "demonstrates a recognition
and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for ... criminal conduct,"
which is the beginning of reform. We should, then, rejoice at an honest confession,
rather than pity the "poor fool" who has made it; and we should regret the at-
tempted retraction of that good act, rather than seek to facilitate and encourage
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mental interest in encouraging guilty pleas.59 Consequently, the
Commission left the two-level sentence reduction to the discretion
of the sentencing judge.60
By preserving judicial discretion in sentence reduction, section
it. To design our laws on premises contrary to these is to abandon belief in either
personal responsibility or the moral claim of just government to obedience.
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
go See Wilkins, supra note 55, at 191 (Commission "concluded that a defendant's ac-
ceptance of responsibility for his conduct has provided a potential basis for mitigation under
existing practices, and that it should continue to be encouraged"); see also Perez-Franco,
873 F.2d at 464 ("two point reduction serves the invaluable function of inducing the defend-
ant to plead guilty"); Sands & Coates, supra note 17, at 63 (section 3E1.1 "is one of the few
'carrots' to facilitate plea bargains, without which the criminal justice system would col-
lapse"). A two-level reduction is effective in inducing guilty pleas because "[w]ithout such a
reduction, there is little incentive for a defendant to plead guilty, as he will receive the same
sentence if he pleads guilty as he would if he were to go to trial and is found guilty." Perez-
Franco, 873 F.2d at 464.
Justice White has noted that there is a "mutuality of advantage" in the plea bargaining
process:
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading
guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious-his exposure is reduced, the
correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial
are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages-the more promptly im-
posed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the
objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and
prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substan-
tial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the
State can sustain its burden of proof.
Brady, 397 U.S. at 752. Furthermore, the majority of criminal convictions result from guilty
pleas. See U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JusTIcE STATISTICS 1988, at 554, table 5.27 (1989) (of 43,942 criminal convictions in federal
district courts for year ending June 30, 1987, 38,440 were disposed of by plea of guilty or
nolo contendere); see also Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L.
REv. 652, 652 n.1 (1981) ("commonly estimated that 90% of all criminal convictions are the
result of guilty pleas"). According to the Commission, "90.2 percent of the first 7,055 de-
fendants sentenced under the Guidelines pleaded guilty." Tonry, Are the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's Guidelines "Working Well"?, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 122, 125 (1989) (citing
U. S. SENTENCING COMa'N, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1989)).
In addition to judicial and law enforcement economy, plea bargaining promotes "socie-
tal interest in the reduction of crime, restitution, early withdrawal from criminal activity,
[and] withdrawal of criminals from positions of trust and responsibility." Belgard, 694 F.
Supp. at 1497.
60 See Wilkins, supra note 55, at 192 (Commission decided existence of acceptance of
responsibility is "offender characteristic [which] is particularly appropriate for determina-
tion by the sentencing judge"). The commentary to § 3E1.1 explains that while "[e]ntry of a
plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial ... will constitute significant evidence of
acceptance of responsibility," the "evidence may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant
that is inconsistent with such acceptance of responsibility." U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 3E1.1,
comment. (n.3). Furthermore, since "[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to evalu-
ate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility," his or her decision "is entitled to great def-
erence on review." Id. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.5).
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3E1.1 retains certain practices as they existed prior to the Guide-
lines,"' when "it was commonplace for judges to factor in the real-
offense behavior as part of the final sentence. '6 2 Thus, restricting
the sentencing decision to charge-offense behavior would contra-
vene the Commission's intent to preserve judicial discretion in
evaluating the defendant's acceptance of responsibility."
The First Circuit in Perez-Franco argued that a real-offense
approach to sentence reduction would actually chill guilty pleas
because a defendant, fearing that any self-incriminating statement
could be used against him in a future criminal prosecution, would
be unwilling to admit responsibility for crimes other than those to
which he had pleaded guilty or of which he had been convicted.6 4
61 See Breyer, supra note 31, at 31 ("[w]ith respect to ... acceptance of responsibil-
ity . . . . the Commission has basically left the problem, for the present, where it found
it"); see also United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 767 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., dis-
senting in part) (describing judges' right to consider defendant's acceptance of responsibility
in sentencing as "hoary tradition"); United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1012 (11th Cir.
1989) (same).
02 Mank, supra note 13, at 195. Prior to the Guidelines, "a sentencing judge could exer-
cise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining
the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law." Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). "Accordingly, the sentencing judge was held not to
have acted unconstitutionally in considering ... the defendant's participation in criminal
conduct for which he had not been convicted .... " United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41,
49 (1978). "[I]ndeed, '[t]o deprive sentencing judges of this kind of information would un-
dermine modern penological procedural policies that have been cautiously adopted through-
out the nation after careful consideration and experimentation.' "Id. (quoting Williams, 337
U.S. at 249-50).
63 Any encroachment on judicial discretion is compounded by the fact that under the
Guidelines a sentencing judge is limited to granting a mere two-level reduction to the de-
fendant who has accepted responsibility, whereas prior to the Guidelines no such restriction
existed. See Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA
L. REv. 83, 89 (1988) ("[ulnder the old indeterminate sentencing system, final determination
of the sentence rested in the discretion of the judge so long as the sentence imposed did not
exceed the statutory maximum").
See Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d at 464 (requiring defendant to accept responsibility for
uncharged crimes "would adversely impact on the plea bargaining process itself"). Professor
Capra reasoned
that while a reduced sentence for acceptance of responsibility of all relevant con-
duct can be justified as an exception to the Fifth Amendment, the sentencing
guideline may fall in its mission to encourage contrition. This is because a defend-
ant who accepts responsibility for uncharged conduct may receive a two-point re-
duction under § 3E1.1, but may simultaneously receive an enhancement when the
sentencing court considers the relevant conduct as part of the defendant's
wrongdoing.
Capra, supra note 12, at 4, col. 6; see also United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 977 n.6,
978 (10th Cir.) (by accepting responsibility for trafficking in twenty-four ounces of heroin
rather than five ounces specified in indictment, defendant "may have increased his sentence
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However, one commentator contests this chilling effect, arguing
that if a sentencing judge conditions reduction of sentence upon
the defendant's acknowledgment of responsibility for other crimes,
"it is likely that a court would hold these admissions involuntary
and therefore inadmissible in any subsequent criminal proceed-
ing." 65 Moreover, the charge-offense approach contravenes the
Commission's intent to reward only those defendants who are sin-
cerely contrite" in that it permits selective admission of guilt for
personal benefit.17
The charge-offense approach would also encroach on judicial
discretion by delegating excessive discretion to the prosecutor.6 8
Because a federal judge acting in the public interest may block the
dismissal of an indictment or refuse to accept a plea bargain,69 one
commentator has argued that the sentencing judge must have "the
authority to question defendants about their real-offense behavior
to ensure that the judiciary can act as an effective watchdog
against potential prosecutorial abuses, however rare." °7 0
by more than four years"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 113 (1990).
Thus, utilization by courts of the real-offense approach to determining acceptance of
responsibility adds an unpredictable dimension to the already precarious plea bargaining
process. See Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 626 (plea bargain "can unravel at any time for any num-
ber of reasons").
6" Mank, supra note 13, at 200. Mank relies on a series of analogous cases finding that
judicial participation in plea -negotiations renders guilty pleas involuntary and invalid. See
id. However, Mank does not address the possibility that pressures to plead guilty in ex-
change for a sentence reduction may arise from other sources. For instance, while accept-
ance-of-responsibility statements made to prosecutors in plea negotiations are inadmissible
in subsequent proceedings, most such statements are made to probation officers preparing
presentence reports and may be used against the defendant in a subsequent action. See
Capra, supra note 12, at 4, col. 6 n.23.
Go See supra note 57 and accompanying text (proposal for automatic sentence reduction
upon plea of guilty rejected as rewarding defendants regardless of circumstances); see also
U.S.S.G., supra note 4, § 3EL., comment. (n.2) ("adjustment is not intended to apply to a
defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential
factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse").
11 Cf. supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of true contrition from
point of view of defendant and society).
6S See Mank, supra note 13, at 196-98 (arguing that real-offense sentencing curbs
prosecutorial abuse). With regard to prosecutorial discretion, "[s]ome observers caution that
discretion operates on a hydraulic model: if it is eliminated in one part of the system, it will
increase at another." L. GOODSTm & J. HEPBURN, DEERMINATE SENTENCING AND IU'RISON-
mEN. A FAILURE OF REFORm 38 (1985). But see Steury, Prosecutorial and Judicial Discre-
tion, in U.S. SENTENCIN GumELiNEs, supra note 55, at 93, 109 n.1 (arguing that "[t]here is
neither compelling logic nor empirical support" for hydraulic model of discretion).
'9 Mank, supra note 13, at 197 (citing United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 617-
18, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
70 Id. at 197-98.
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II. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION OR PENALTY ON EXERCISE OF
FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST COMPELLED SELF-
INCRIMINATION?
Assuming that section 3E1.1 requires a defendant to accept re-
sponsibility for all relevant criminal conduct, the next issue that
must be addressed is whether such a construction violates the de-
fendant's fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation.71 Although no court has held section 3E1.1 facially invalid,
a number of courts have indicated that the section may violate the
Constitution as applied in a particular case.72 For example, some
courts have determined that conditioning a section 3E1.1 reduction
in sentence on the waiver of constitutionally protected rights is un-
constitutional.73  According to this "unconstitutional conditions
doctrine," the denial of a reduction in sentence based on the de-
71 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall any person... be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself"). The fifth amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination was made applicable to the states by incorporation via the fourteenth
amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) ("Fourteenth Amendment secures
against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against fed-
eral infringement").
The constitutional analysis of § 3E1.1 is important in defining the scope of "criminal
conduct": "When [an] incongruity amounts to a constitutional infirmity, we must reexamine
the doctrine, or, at the very least, limit its reach so as to avoid the unconstitutional." United
States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 767 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting in part).
72 See, e.g., United States v. Cordell, 924 F.2d 614, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding §
3E1.1 constitutional "on its face" and as "applied in this case"); United States v. Watt, 910
F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting "facial challenge to section 3El.l" but concluding
that "improper application... could impinge on an accused's assertion of his constitutional
rights"); Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 628-29 (concluding that § 3E1.1 is constitutional if properly
interpreted and applied).
73 See, e.g., Watt, 910 F.2d at 592 ("in determining a defendant's acceptance of respon-
sibility, a sentencing court cannot consider against a defendant any constitutionally pro-
tected conduct").
It is well established that a court cannot impose additional punishment upon a defend-
ant who refuses to waive his or her right against self-incrimination. See United States v.
Ramos, 572 F.2d 360, 363 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978). However, it is unclear whether conditioning a
benefit upon the waiver of one's constitutional rights also amounts to "punishment." See,
e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973) (conditioning benefit upon waiver of
rights found unconstitutional, but no discussion of whether decision was based on Court's
finding of punishment or on denial of benefit).
The Supreme Court has upheld the practice of offering reduced sentences for plea bar-
gains. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 223 (1978) ("it is not forbidden to extend a
proper degree of leniency in return for guilty pleas"). Indeed, if such a practice were deemed
unconstitutional, the important policy goal of inducing guilty pleas could not be effectuated,
and the ability of our court system to function would be serfously threatened. See generally
United States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488 (D. Or. 1988) (discussing various societal bene-
fits derived from guilty pleas).
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fendant's refusal to accept responsibility for crimes to which he
has not pleaded guilty and of which he has not been convicted is
equivalent to penalizing the defendant for exercising his fifth
amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.74
Other courts, refusing to recognize the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine, argue that the government is not penalizing the de-
fendant by denying a reduction in sentence, but simply denying a
benefit to which the defendant is not automatically entitled.75
Even if the sole purpose of section 3E1.1 were to induce guilty
pleas, the constitutionality of the government's bargaining for a
guilty plea in exchange for a reduced sentence is well established.7 6
7' See Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 626 ("effect of requiring a defendant to accept responsibil-
ity for crimes other than those to which he pled guilty or of which he has been found guilty
is to penalize him for refusing to incriminate himself"); Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d at 463
("government cannot impose penalties because a person elects to exercise his fifth amend-
ment right not to give incriminating testimony against himself"). However, pursuant to the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the "government may not grant a benefit on the condi-
tion that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may with-
hold that benefit altogether." Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413, 1415 (1989). The doctrine "reflects the triumph of the view that government may not
do indirectly what it may not do directly over the view that the greater power to deny a
benefit includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its receipt." Id. But while "[t]he
Supreme Court has consistently held that imposing punishment on a person who invokes his
Fifth Amendment rights is impermissible compulsion," it "has been considerably more
vague about whether Fifth Amendment compulsion can be found where the government
conditions a benefit on a waiver of the right against self-incrimination." Capra, supra note
12, at 3, col. 2. For a discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see generally
Sullivan, supra, and Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 337 (1989).
7' See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 982-83 (10th Cir.) ("[t]here is a
difference between increasing the severity of a sentence for failure to demonstrate remorse
and refusing to grant a reduction from the prescribed base offense level"), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 113 (1990); United States v. Rowland, 906 F.2d 621, 622 (11th Cir. 1990) (section
"3E1.1 is not a penalty or sentence enhancement provision, but is rather a section providing
for leniency under certain statutorily prescribed conditions"); United States v. Gonzalez,
897 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1990) ("reduction provided for in Section 3E1.1 is merely a
benefit which may be accorded to a defendant if he is able to make the necessary showing").
Not only are defendants not automatically entitled to a sentence reduction, but they
must prove entitlement to the reduction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Rogers,
921 F.2d at 982 ("burden of proof for establishing entitlement to a reduction of the offense
level for acceptance of responsibility is on the defendant, who must establish the mitigating
factor by a preponderance of the evidence"); United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321, 1328,
1328 n.9 (6th Cir. 1990) (although government bears burden of proving justification for en-
hancement of sentence, defendant bears burden of proving entitlement to reduction), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 980 (1991).
7' See United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 826 (5th Cir.) ("fact that a more lenient
sentence is imposed upon a contrite defendant does not establish a corollary that those who
elect to stand trial are penalized"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 (1989).
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Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has noted, although the denial
of a reduction in sentence may place some burden on the defend-
ant's fifth amendment rights, "not every burden on the exercise of
a constitutional right, and not every pressure or encouragement to
waive such a right, is invalid. 7 7
The Second Circuit argued that the distinction between penal-
izing a defendant and withholding a benefit is a "simple dichot-
omy" that the "[c]ourts squarely have rejected. 7  This proposi-
tion, however, is an overstatement.7 9 While the dichotomy has been
rejected by a number of courts ° and is criticized within academic
circles, 81 it remains entrenched in constitutional analysis.8 2 More-
7 Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 218. Judge Kozinski characterized this rationale "as the rough-
and-tumble theory of justice: While 'Section 3E1.1 may add to the dilemmas facing criminal
defendants .... no good reason exists to believe that [§] 3E1.1 was intended to punish
anyone for exercising rights.'" United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 769 (9th Cir. 1991)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting in part) (quoting United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th
Cir. 1989)).
18 Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 627. According to Judge Kozinski, all that can be said about the
argument that a benefit can be denied for any reason is "that it will persuade only those
who are already persuaded." Aichele, 941 F.2d at 769 (Kozinski, J., dissenting in part).
7' See Sullivan, supra note 74, at 1415 (academic support for unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine "has not put an end to confusion about its application"). Even the Second
Circuit conceded that the Supreme Court was treating the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine inconsistently. See Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 628 n.7 (comparing Supreme Court cases con-
sidering placement of conditions on constitutional rights).
88 See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987) (unconsti-
tutional to condition building permit on grant of public easement); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70, 82-83 (1973) (unconstitutional to condition future contracts on waiver of right
against compelled self-incrimination); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-09 (1963) (un-
constitutional to condition unemployment compensation on Seventh-Day Adventist's agree-
ment to work Saturdays).
81 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 74, at 344 ("[w]hether there is a penalty or a subsidy
is immaterial").
82 See L. TRIBE, AmERicAN CONSrrTmONAL LAW § 11-5, at 781 (2d ed. 1988) ("problem
pervading much of contemporary constitutional law is that of drawing a workable distinc-
tion between government's" broad power to subsidize or encourage and its narrow power to
penalize or discourage). Distinctions between penalties and inducement lie at the heart of
the analysis under the national spending power of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8 ("Congress shall have Power To... pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States"); see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 73
(1936) ("[t]here is an obvious difference between a statute stating the conditions upon
which moneys shall be expended and one effective only upon assumption of a contractual
obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise could not be enforced"). But see L.
TInE, supra, § 5-10, at 322 ("Supreme Court has effectively ignored Butler in judging the
limits of congressional spending power" because "distinction proved unworkable").
The Court has also distinguished between affirmative and negative obligations in the
context of public funding of abortions. Compare Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)
("it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional
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over, following the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to its lit-
eral conclusion would wreak administrative havoc because virtually
every governmental decision impacts to some degree on constitu-
tional rights.83 Thus, an alternative approach is required in order
to reconcile section 3E1.1 with the fifth amendment.8 4
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM OF
SECTION 3E1.1
A. Nature of Right at Stake
The Second Circuit suggested in Oliveras that the analysis of
section 3E1.1 should "focus not on the distinction between a pen-
alty and a benefit, but instead on the nature of the right at
stake."85 Since section 3E1.1 places a burden on the exercise of a
fifth amendment right, it is subjected to a heightened level of scru-
tiny. s Thus, according to the Second Circuit, "while there may be
a legitimate interest in obtaining admissions of responsibility from
entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices")
with id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that proposition is not that State has
affirmative obligation to subsidize abortions, but that it "must refrain from wielding its
enormous power and influence in a manner that might burden the pregnant woman's free-
dom to choose whether to have an abortion").
83 Cf. G. GUNTHER, CONsrruTIoNAL LAW 586 (11th ed. 1985) ("[a]lmost all laws classify,
by imposing special burdens or granting special benefits to some groups or individuals and
not to others"). Pursuant to a strict interpretation of the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine, plea bargaining would have to be declared unlawful because defendants who exercise
their constitutional right to trial face a potential sentence greater than that received by
defendants who plead guilty. See Capra, supra note 12, at 4, col. 3; see also Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970) (holding plea bargaining constitutional despite fact that
defendant standing trial faces' potentially greater sentence than defendant who pleads
guilty). "Given the efficiency factors and other policies furthered by plea bargaining," it is
unlikely that the Supreme Court would be willing to invalidate the practice. Capra, supra
note 12, at 4, col. 3; see also supra note 73 (noting importance of plea bargaining in Ameri-
can penal system).
With regard to the "distinction between increasing the severity of a sentence for a de-
fendant's failure to cooperate and refusing to grant leniency," the Second Circuit conceded
that although "'the distinction is somewhat illusory, it is the only rule that recognizes the
reality of the criminal justice system while protecting the integrity of that system."' United
States v. Stratton, 820 F.2d 562, 564 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Mallette v. Scully, 752 F.2d 26,
30 (2d Cir. 1984)); accord United States v. Cortes, 922 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1990).
" See Capra, supra note 12, at 4, col. 5 (suggesting exception to fifth amendment for
Brady line of cases).
5liveras, 905 F.2d at 628 (citing Sunstein, supra note 74).
8 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[t]here may
be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of
the first ten amendments").
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defendants for criminal conduct other than that included in the
plea bargain," this governmental need is not sufficiently compelling
to justify compelled self-incrimination. 7
For two reasons, however, this substantive-due-process ap-
proach seems no more desirable than the denial-of-benefit ap-
proach. First, the substantive-due-process approach requires the
judiciary to embark on the unpleasant and complex task of deter-
mining the degree of importance of the right at stake." Second, it
would seem to necessitate declaring plea bargaining unconstitu-
tional because "[i]f a promise of leniency for pleading guilty and
accepting responsibility were impermissible compulsion, the state
could not constitutionally provide an incentive to plead guilty."' 9
B. Creating a New Exception to the Fifth Amendment
Courts could also reconcile the denial-of-benefit "line of cases
with Fifth Amendment concepts of compulsion" by openly ac-
knowledging that these cases "establish an exception to Fifth
87 Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 628. Laws that trigger a strict scrutiny analysis "will be sus-
tained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest." City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); cf. Gunther, The Su-
preme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (strict scrutiny is strict
in theory but fatal in fact).
" See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) ("[s]ubstantive due pro-
cess has at times been a treacherous field for this Court"). Since the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination is not an absolute constitutional right, Roberts v. United States,
445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980) ("Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination
is not self-executing"), is it therefore less fundamental? Cf. Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 628 ("there
is no valid state interest in requiring a defendant to give up his right to an attorney").
"[T]here is reason for concern lest the only limits to ... judicial intervention become the
predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court." Moore, 431
U.S. at 502 (citations omitted). It seems likely that the constitutionality of § 3E1.1 likewise
will hinge on personal predilections:
It was this unlikely coalition of political liberals and conservatives which drafted
and passed determinate sentencing laws.
Yet, important differences in focus exist between conservatives and liberals.
Whereas liberals focused on the rights and privileges of convicted offenders, con-
servatives believed that the criminal justice system demonstrated too little con-
cern for crime's victims and other law abiding members of society. Moreover, con-
servatives reacted against what they felt was a permissive and undisciplined
criminal justice system which was too tolerant of crime and too lenient with
criminals.
L. GoODSTEIN & J. HEPBURN, supra note 68, at 24 (citations omitted).
89 Capra, supra note 12, at 4, col. 3; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)
("fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating func-
tions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution").
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Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination. '' s°
Given the clarity of the concept and the Supreme Court's willing-
ness to create new exceptions to the fifth amendment,9' the excep-
tion route may have some merit. However, the courts must remain
mindful that once they start whittling away at a constitutional
doctrine through exceptions; they create a risk that the exceptions
will swallow the rule. 2
C. Enjoining Use of Defendant's Statements in Future Trials
The Second Circuit held that a sentencing judge could condi-
tion a two-level reduction in sentence on a defendant's acceptance
of responsibility for uncharged crimes only if the defendant's state-
ments were "immunized against use in subsequent criminal prose-
cutions."9 3 According to one commentator, however, such immu-
nity from prosecution is unnecessary because "if a sentencing court
requires a defendant to make self-incriminating statements to re-
ceive a sentence reduction, then those statements are involuntary
under the fifth amendment and cannot be used in a subsequent
criminal trial. '94 Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that another
court will find the defendant's self-incriminating statements to
have been involuntary, thus the argument is flawed.95 Furthermore,
:0 Capra, supra note 12, at 4, col. 5.
91 See, e.g., Shapiro v. United States,, 335 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1948) (creating required
records exception to fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination).
92 See, e.g., Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doc-
trine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 59, 163 (1989) ("w]e must now recognize
that Miranda has been silently buried"); Collins, Is Miranda Crumbling?, Nat'l L.J., Feb.
20, 1990, at 15, col. 2 ("Miranda's judicial critics affirmed their fidelity to the symbol while
ever diminishing its real-world effect"). Another area of the law in which the exceptions
have become the rule is the hearsay rule that excludes evidence of other crimes. See Com-
monwealth v. Brown, 462 Pa. 578, 593, 342 A.2d 84, 92 (1975) (Roberts, J., concurring)
("traditional 'rule' of exclusion [for evidence of other crimes committed by defendant] is so
riddled with vague and overlapping 'exceptions' that it would be more enlightening and
more candid to say that the 'exceptions' have become the rule and the traditional 'rule' is an
exception"); Comment, Admissibility of Prior Acquitted Crimes Under Rule 404(b): Why
the Majority Should Adopt the Minority Rule, 16 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1033, 1034 n.9 (1989)
("[i]n practice, the exceptions have become the rule, so 'other crimes' evidence is almost
always admitted").
93 Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 626. The defendant's statements must be immunized because
"[a] plea bargain can unravel at any time, for any number of reasons." Perez-Franco, 873
F.2d at 460.
" Mank, supra note 13, at 184.
95 See United States v. Long, 852 F.2d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that while gov-
ernment-offered inducement is important factor, it does not automatically render defend-
ant's statement involuntary); see also Mank, supra note 13, at 200 ("it is likely that a court
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because the policy behind the exclusionary rule for involuntary
statements is to discourage government officials from seeking
to compel statements, it seems anomalous to cite the exclusionary
rule to justify compelling a defendant's self-incriminating
admissions.9 6
D. Deference to Sentencing Judge's Credibility Determination
A number of courts have reconciled section 3E1.1 with the
fifth amendment by resting "on deference to the sentencing judge's
credibility determination that the defendant had not accepted re-
sponsibility for the crimes of which he had been convicted. ' s7 Ac-
cordingly, some courts have held that the sentencing judge may
consider uncharged criminal conduct to cast doubt on the credibil-
ity of a defendant's purported expressions of remorse.9 8 Similarly,
the Second Circuit noted that "[i]f there were another clearly per-
missible basis for the court's denial of the reduction," it "could
affirm on that other basis notwithstanding the court's reliance on
one flawed basis." ' The problem with this approach, however, is
that regardless of whether the reduction is predicated solely on the
defendant's acceptance of responsibility for an uncharged crime or
whether the uncharged crime is used as one of the factors to de-
tract from the defendant's credibility, the defendant in effect may
would hold these admissions involuntary") (emphasis added).
0 See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination reflects "our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisi-
torial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited
by inhumane treatment and abuses").
9 Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 631 (emphasis in original).
08 See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 912 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Cooper's subse-
quent fraudulent purchase of the car detracts from the credibility of her expressions of re-
morse for the fraudulent activities of which she was convicted"); United States v. Wivell,
893 F.2d 156, 159 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Wivell's arrest for dealing in cocaine while he was on
bond awaiting disposition of this case was a clear indication that he was continuing his
criminal course of conduct"); United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968, 974 (7th Cir. 1989) ("it
is difficult to credit Jordan with acceptance of responsibility in light of his continued drug
dealing").
" United States v. Santiago, 906 F.2d 867, 873 (2d Cir. 1990); see also United States v.
Guarin, 898 F.2d 1120, 1122 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Perez-Franco is instructive only when, absent
the district court's allegedly illegitimate expectation, there is clear evidence that the defend-
ant actually accepted responsibility"). In Santiago, the court denied a reduction in sentence
in part because of the defendant's "refus[al] to acknowledge his prior [drug] sales to Shat-
tuck." Santiago, 906 F.2d at 873. Although consideration of prior criminal activity was "im-
permissible," the Second Circuit suggested that it would disturb the sentence only if the
"impermissible" basis was the sole basis for the sentencing judge's decision. See id. at 873-
74 (remanding case to determine whether proper basis existed).
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be denied a reduction in sentence for remaining silent.100
E. Mitigating Factor Theory
A fifth alternative method of reconciling section 3E1.1 with
the fifth amendment is to apply the mitigating factor theory,",
which is conceptually distinct from the denial-of-benefit ap-
proach. 02 By analogy to the law of homicide, which requires a de-
fendant to prove extreme emotional disturbance as an affirmative
defense to mitigate a charge of murder to manslaughter, 0 3 this
theory suggests that it should also be constitutional to require a
defendant to prove acceptance of responsibility by a preponder-
ance of the evidence in order to mitigate his sentence by two
100 Cf. Capra, supra note 12, at 4, col. 5 ("[c]haracterizing more time in jail as a 'denial
of a benefit' rather than punishment is cold comfort to the defendant" because from "de-
fendant's point of view, he is spending more time in jail because of his refusal to incriminate
himself").
101 See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 982 (10th Cir.) (reduction of offense
level for acceptance of responsibility is "mitigating factor" that defendant must establish by
preponderance of evidence), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 113 (1990); United States v. Gordon,
895 F.2d 932, 936-37 (4th Cir.) ("acceptance of responsibility is a mitigating factor available
under appropriate circumstances"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990). But cf. Sands &
Coates, supra note 17, at 82 (arguing that treating acceptance of responsibility as "mitigat-
ing benefit" is unconstitutional).
102 The two theories, however, are analytically similar. Compare United States v. Gon-
zalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1990) ("reduction provided for in section 3E1.1 is merely
a benefit which may be accorded to a defendant if he is able to make the necessary show-
ing") with Rogers, 921 F.2d at 982 ("burden of proof for establishing entitlement to a reduc-
tion of the offense level for acceptance of responsibility is on the defendant, who must es-
tablish the mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence"). A "benefit" refers to
"[the receiving as the exchange for promise some performance or forbearance which prom-
isor was not previously entitled to receive." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 158 (6th ed. 1990).
"Mitigation," on the other hand, refers to circumstances that "do not constitute a justifica-
tion or excuse for the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be consid-
ered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability." Id. at 1002.
103 See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206 (1977) (Constitution not violated be-
cause "if the intentional killing is shown, the State intends to deal with the defendant as a
murderer unless he demonstrates the mitigating circumstances"). Arguably, an affirmative
defense places the burden of proof on a criminal defendant to disprove an element of the
crime of murder, i.e., a sane mind. See id. at 225-27 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that
affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance unconstitutionally shifts burden of
proof to defendant on element of crime). Yet, a defendant in federal court must prove the
affimative defense of insanity not merely by a preponderance of the evidence, but by clear
and convincing evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (1988); see also United States v. Byrd, 834
F.2d 145, 146-47 (8th Cir. 1987) (constitutional to require defendant to prove affirmative
defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence); United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d
1574, 1576 (11th Cir. 1986) (same).
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CONCLUSION
This Note has outlined the various approaches that courts
have taken in reconciling the two-level reduction in sentence pro-
vided by section 3E1.1 with the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Doctrinally, this tension can be resolved in one
of five ways: by characterizing the reduction in sentence as a bene-
fit, by expressly recognizing an exception to the fifth amendment
for admissions of relevant criminal conduct, by deeming any con-
fessions or admissions to the sentencing judge to be involuntary
and therefore inadmissible at subsequent trials, by deferring to the
sentencing judge's credibility determination, or by declaring an ad-
mission of responsibility a mitigating factor to be proved by the
defendant. Ultimately, however, resolving the conflict will require
the Supreme Court to balance the defendant's constitutional privi-
lege against compelled self-incrimination against society's interests
in providing just punishment, rewarding contrite defendants, and
promoting judicial efficiency.
The Commission, in drafting section 3E1.1, provided a sen-
tence adjustment level that is carefully tailored to induce pleas
104 Rogers, 921 F.2d at 982. In debating the constitutionality of awarding sentence re-
ductions for guilty pleas, the Commission may have been influenced by the mitigating factor
theory:
Investing the Court with discretion to mitigate the sentence by a specified amount
or amounts, rather than directing specified "guilty plea credit" in all cases, would
very much undercut any constitutional objection to the plan. As the Commission
is aware, the Constitution has been held to forbid imposition of a penalty for a
"defendant's unsuccessful choice to stand trial." Smith v. Wainwright, 664 F.2d
1194, 1196 (5th Cir. 1981). Of course, the Supreme Court has held that this does
not forbid extending a "proper degree of leniency in return for guilty pleas." Cor-
bitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 223 (1978). The line that distinguishes a sentenc-
ing scheme which simply provides leniency to those who plead from that which
impermissibly punishes those who go to trial, however, may not always be a clear
one. One key factor appears be [sic] whether the sentencing scheme at least allows
the same punishment to be imposed upon those who plead and those who go to
trial.
Wilkins, supra note 55, at 191 n.65 (quoting United States Sentencing Comm'n Public
Hearing on Plea Agreements in Washington, D.C. 3-4 (Sept. 23, 1986)) (emphasis added).
The defendant's burden of proof is the aspect of § 3E1.1 that the Third Circuit found
most troubling. See United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 663 (3d Cir. 1991) ("tension
between Fifth Amendment privilege and § 3El.1 is greatest when the rule's assignment of
the burden of proof to the defendant comes into play"). The court therefore advised sen-
tencing judges to evaluate the defendant's contrition based on inferences from the evidence
in the record rather than on the allocation of proof. See id.
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from guilty defendants but not to pressure innocent ones.105 In
view of the Commission's circumspection, the strong societal inter-
ests in rewarding only contrite defendants and promoting judicial
efficiency, and the increasing recognition of victims' rights in con-
nection with sentencing decisions, 10 6 the Supreme Court should
validate the sentencing judge's authority to consider uncharged
crimes in determining the defendant's entitlement to a reduction
in sentence. Sentencing judges have always possessed such discre-
tion, and the Guidelines merely codify this tradition. As asserted
by Justice Scalia, "We should ... rejoice at an honest confession,
rather than pity the 'poor fool' who has made it; and we should
regret the attempted retraction of that good act, rather than seek
to facilitate and encourage it."1 '
Luke T. Dokla
105 Wilkins, supra note 55, at 190 n.62 (quoting United States Sentencing Comm'n
Public Hearing on Plea Agreements in Washington, D.C. 8, 16 (Sept. 23, 1986)) ("discount
should be small" because "[l]arger discounts would pressure a plea from the innocent de-
fendant who has significant prospects for acquittal at trial"). Thus, under a strict scrutiny
analysis it may be argued that § 3E1.1 is "suitably tailored." See supra note 87 (articulating
strict scrutiny test).
120 See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[r]ecent years have seen an outpouring of popular concern for what has come to be known
as 'victims' rights,"' which weighs "amount of harm [defendant] has caused to innocent
members of society"), overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597
(1991); see also Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608-09 (permitting victim impact statements in sen-
tencing phase of death penalty trial). But see Stewart, Springtime for Criminals, 77 A.B.A.
J. 43, 43 (Mar. 1991) (commenting that two recent pro-defendant Supreme Court decisions
following Justice Brennan's retirement resulted in "temporary setback" for conservative
Court's efforts "to shake off the Warren Court's legacy of 'mollycoddling' criminal defend-
ants"). Traditionally, the Supreme Court has been zealous in protecting the rights of poor
and uneducated criminal defendants because otherwise they would be defenseless against
the majoritarian processes of government. See L. Timn, supra note 82, § 16-40, at 1634
("[c]riminal procedure represents the most significant area in which concern for equal jus-
tice for the poor has found expression in constitutional guarantees other than those of equal
protection"); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (fair trial "cannot be
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to
assist him"). However, this social philosophy has been criticized because the victims of
crime are often as poor and defenseless as their aggressors. See, e.g., U. S. STATE DEPT OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1989 BJS DATA REPORT 15 (1990) ("during 1988
blacks, Hispanics, and the poor were victims of serious crime significantly more often than
were other people"); Inbau & Manak, Miranda v. Arizona-Is it Worth the Cost? (A Sample
Survey, with Commentary, of the Expenditure of Court Time and Effort), 24 CAL. W.L.
Ray. 185, 198 (1988) ("with regard to the underlying social philosophy of Miranda: a very
high percentage of the victims of crime are from the ranks of the poor, the uneducated, or
the unintelligent").
107 Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 498 (1990).

